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‘Marking time?’ – The evolution of the
Australian national innovation system,
1996-2005
Sam Garrett-Jones

___________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews developments in Australia’s national system of
innovation over about the last decade. It focuses in particular on the
objectives and effectiveness of the policies adopted by the current federal
government since its election in 1996, and the prospects and challenges that
Australia now faces in science and innovation.
Australia is different – in its economy, society and needs for technology –
and yet its innovation policy apes the strongly market driven rhetoric of the
large G8 economies. I argue that after 20 years of neo-liberal policies under
successive labour and conservative governments the innovation system in
Australia is at a crossroads. While market driven neo-liberal policies have
improved the level of industrial innovation (though not without large
government subsidies and with mixed success in the case of smaller firms)
business investment in R&D and innovation is still low by OECD standards
and, in contrast to many other countries, has barely grown in the last 10
years. Perhaps contentiously, I further argue that the critical weakness in
Australia’s innovation system is now the erosion of investment in public
sector research. This is placing huge pressure on the universities, which are
being required to take on the tasks of collaborating more closely with
business and carrying out the industrially oriented, regionally important and
public good strategic research. These demands may prove impossible to
achieve at current levels of public funding to higher education and the
government research organisations.
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The socioeconomic landscape
Australia is a rich, medium sized ‘industrialised’ nation, but one that sits
apart from the larger ‘G8’ countries in geography, historical development,
economy and technology. Its population and economic activities are
dispersed across the continent, presenting regional diversity and barriers to
interaction. Australia’s population of over 20 million is growing by 1.2 per
cent annually, of which over half of the growth is accounted for by net
immigration from overseas (Trewin, 2005). It enjoys a federal system of
government with responsibilities shared by the Australian (or
Commonwealth) government and eight State and Territory administrations.
Its businesses are distant from the major markets of Europe and North
America but close to rapidly expanding Asian markets. While the ‘tyranny of
distance’ (Blainey, 1966) was largely overcome in the 20th century by
telecommunications, mass air transport and, lately, by the advent of global
electronic networks, Australia’s society, economy and innovation system still
carry its legacy.
The last decade has seen strong economic growth. Australia’s GDP per
capita stood at about US$29,000 in 2003 (at 2000 prices, PPP adjusted)
(World Bank, 2005). GDP growth is around 3% (2.8% in 2002-03) and over
the period 1994–2003 averaged 3.8% annually. This economic performance
places Australia in the top half of the rank of OECD-member countries.
However, as Table 1 shows, Australia’s industry structure has changed little
since 1996. The major structural changes in the economy occurred between
1985 and 1996 with a strong decline in agriculture and growth in
manufacturing and services. The services sector remained the largest
contributor to the economy in 2002 – at over 70% of GDP – substantially
unchanged since 1996. However, the economic contribution of agriculture
continued to decline to less than 3% of GDP in 2002 (Table 1).
Manufacturing remained relatively stable at 12 – 13% of GDP.
Compared to other small-medium OECD economies, Australia has a
relatively low trade intensity (Scott-Kemmis, 2004b). The indicators of trade
and globalisation of Australian industry since 1996 (Table 1) show mixed
outcomes. Foreign direct investment (FDI) (both net inflows and total)
increased substantially. Overall, trade has become more important, but no
growth is seen in exports of goods and services (as a proportion of GDP)
between 1996 and 2002. This stands in contrast to the marked expansion of
manufactures exports in the previous decade.
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Table 1. Australia: Selected economic indicators, 1985 to 2002

1985
Agriculture, value added
(% of GDP)
Industry, value added
(% of GDP)
Manufacturing, value added
(% of GDP)
Services, etc., value added
(% of GDP)
Foreign direct investment, net
inflows (% of GDP)
Gross foreign direct
investment (% of GDP)
Trade (% of GDP)
Exports of goods and services
(% of GDP)
Food exports
(% of merchandise exports)
Manufactures exports
(% of merchandise exports)
Ores and metals exports
(% of merchandise exports)

1996

2002

Change
1985-96

Change
19962002

5.2

3.6

2.9

-30.9%

-18.4%

35.1

27.1

25.9

-22.7%

-4.3%

..

13.5

11.8

..

-12.6%

59.7

69.3

71.1

16.0%

2.6%

1.2

1.5

3.8

25.5%

155.2%

2.3
34.7

3.8
39.4

6.3
41.9

65.2%
13.7%

68.3%
6.3%

15.7

19.8

19.7

26.7%

-0.7%

24.8

24.8

21.8

0.0%

-12.4%

16.1

29.8

28.8

85.9%

-3.4%

18.1

15.7

15.9

-13.4%

1.5%

Source: World Bank 2005.

OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL INNOVATION
SYSTEM
The special socioeconomic character of Australia is mirrored in its
innovation system. Bob Gregory, writing in Richard Nelson’s seminal
comparative book on national innovation systems, reviewed Australia’s
situation in the 1980s (Gregory, 1993). He identified several unique features
of the system: (i) a low level of science and technology (S&T) expenditure;
(ii) a high level of government involvement in both funding and undertaking
research and of funding the universities; (iii) a low level of business R&D;
and (iv) an exceptionally high dependence on foreign technology.
The low S&T expenditure is the product of limited business investment in
innovation and research and development (R&D). By contrast, Australia’s
public sector R&D expenditure is on a par or higher than leading countries.
Australia
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Australia’s relatively high level of government-performed R&D (GOVERD)
has been justified officially as reflecting ‘factors like our industrial structure,
biodiversity and the importance of the agricultural sector’ (Australian
Government, 2003),p 10). The Australian government takes the major role in
supporting science and innovation. It is responsible for the largest public
research agencies, for funding the greater share of research and teaching
within Australia’s 40 or so universities and for national promotion of
industrial R&D and technological innovation. The State and Territory
governments are active in traditional areas such as agricultural research and
extension and in promoting regional industrial development. Their
innovation and technology programs increasingly complement or leverage
federal government initiatives and support research infrastructure such as the
Australian Synchrotron.
When measured using a composite index of innovative capacity 1 (Porter
and Stern, 2001) Australia has been described as ‘a low second tier
innovation economy’ making a solid contribution to international knowledge
but performing below others in the OECD middle ranking group such as
Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Germany (Stern and Gans, 2003). In terms
of national investments in R&D and innovation, patenting in the US, and
export of ‘high technology’ goods Australia ranks in the lower half of the
OECD countries (Dept. of Industry Tourism and Resources, n.d.). Australia’s
‘science base’ 2 is generally perceived as stronger than its technology: it
performs well against other OECD countries (corrected for population size)
on outputs of scientific papers, but poorly on US utility patents for example
(Dept. of Industry Tourism and Resources, n.d.);(Australian Government,
2003). Australia’s world class science was again recognised in 2005 with the
award of the Nobel Prize for physiology or medicine to Barry Marshall and
Robin Warren for discovering the cause of gastritis and peptic ulcer disease.
Marshall and Warren join nine other Australian Nobel laureates, six of whom
are also in physiology or medicine.
Through the late 1980s and early 1990s the pattern of R&D investment
changed considerably (Garrett-Jones, 2004). Business expenditure on R&D
(BERD) grew markedly to peak at 0.86 per cent of GDP in 1995-96;
business funding of R&D in the higher education and government sectors
also increased substantially; and, in the public sector, expenditure by the
government in its own research institutes declined and the universities
eclipsed the government laboratories in their R&D effort. In this regard,
Australia has become more like the leading OECD countries, where business
innovation drives the national innovation system.
1

A high proportion of public expenditure on R&D counts as a negative
factor in the index.
2
I use this UK term in the Australian context to cover research and research
training in higher education, publicly performed research, and publicly
sponsored research in non-commercial organisations.
Australia
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While business R&D expenditure in services (as a proportion of value
added) is close to the OECD average, R&D expenditure in manufacturing by
comparison is substantially lower than the average for the OECD countries.
Around 40 per cent of Australia’s businesses carried out some form of
innovation in the three years to 2003, although more than 60 per cent of the
larger firms (100+ employees) were innovators (Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 2005). However, the 2003 innovation survey data show a sustained
decline in the proportion of manufacturing firms undertaking product
innovation by comparison with survey data from 1994 and 1997 (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 2005).
Recent analyses (Marceau and Manley, 2001) and (Scott-Kemmis,
2004b) explain how Australian business innovation differs from the smallmedium OECD innovation systems like Finland, Ireland and Canada. There
are few Australian based multinational companies and many of the large
companies operating in Australia are headquartered overseas, leading to what
has been called a ‘branch office economy’ (Garnaut, 2002). Like several of
the case studies in this book, there is a high level of foreign ownership and
investment, particularly in the R&D intensive industry sectors (ScottKemmis, 2004b). Australia’s largest R&D performing firms include GM
Holden, Ford and Bosch. Further, there are many small local firms, which
make a proportionally larger contribution to business R&D (Scott-Kemmis,
2004b). Australia’s manufacturing sector and especially ‘high tech’
manufacturing industry are relatively small. These sectors are strong R&D
performers in other industrialised countries (Scott-Kemmis, 2004b). Lastly,
many businesses remain directly or indirectly reliant on Australia’s historical
economic ‘trump cards’ of agriculture and natural resources production and
processing. As a consequence of the country’s relative specialisation in
natural resource based commodities, Scott-Kemmis (2004b) stresses the
importance of firms he characterises as ‘resource-enabled but knowledgebased’. An example is Australia’s well-known and successful wine industry.
As Marceau and Manley point out, it is especially the case in Australia that
innovation in the services industry has been closely connected with (and
dependent upon) growth and innovation in the manufacturing, mining and
resources industries, (Marceau and Manley, 2001). So, for example, the
growth of software services for mining depends on a thriving mining
industry. While Scott-Kemmis (Scott-Kemmis, 2004a; 2004b) observes that
Australian firms are effective ‘system integrators’ in their use and adaptation
of technology, he also concludes that firms and industries are strongly ‘path
dependent’ and slow to evolve in terms of their technological specialisation.
The innovation system as whole is therefore conservative and slow to
capitalise on emerging areas.
Australia’s innovative companies are typically exporters in the agricultural
and minerals related sectors, or in niche markets often derived from public
Australia
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sector research strengths. Successful firms include Cochlear and ResMed
(medical devices), Aristocrat Leisure (gaming machines), CSL
(biopharmaceuticals) and Metabolic Pharmaceuticals.
Challenges to the Australian innovation system
Australia’s strong economic growth through the past decade does not appear
to have been matched by the performance of the innovation system. Scott
Kemmis (2004b) concludes that while Australia has experienced strong
economic growth for a decade or more progress according to many standard
innovation indicators falling. Similarly, Marceau and Manley (2001)
conclude that Australia’s innovation performance has been relatively poor
over the past few years.
Scott-Kemmis views trends in Australia’s innovation system in terms of
two ‘contrasting perspectives’. The first which is positive, reflects the
dynamic growth of the system. It emphasises factors such as the strong
public investment in R&D, strong performance in international science, high
education levels in the labour force, the growth of manufacturing
specialisation (wine, automotive components etc) and technological
specialisation (biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, medical instruments); the
strong diffusion and effective use of information and communications
technologies (ICT), and the growth of knowledge-based services. Marceau
and Manley (2001) also identify the growth in knowledge-based service
industries, a strong increase in investment in machinery and equipment, and
expansion (from a low base) of venture capital.
A second, less rosy, ‘laggard’ perspective focuses on Australia’s low
ranking within the OECD in indicators like level of GERD and BERD, poor
export performance in medium and high tech manufacturing, limited
availability of venture capital, international patenting (both in quantity and
degree of specialisation), reliance on resource-based commodity exports and
technology trade deficit (Scott-Kemmis, 2004b). Marceau and Manley
(2001) identify further constraints in a declining proportion of firms claiming
to undertake either product or process innovation; a fall in business R&D;
poor management skills; the small contribution of the manufacturing sector
to GDP; and a low and declining investment in staff training .
I draw two main conclusions from these analysts’ important work. The
first is that the Australia’s innovation system is unique and does not neatly fit
the pattern of, say, the middle ranking OECD countries. This distinctiveness
of Australia’s economy and its influence on patterns of innovation is widely
acknowledge. The second conclusion, which is less generally accepted, is
that policy prescriptions for science and innovation in Australia need to be
tailored to local conditions and may differ markedly from the policies applied
in other OECD countries. Gregory, for example, while comparing Australia
with other OECD countries, saw it as ‘strange’ that the emphasis of
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governments in the 1980s was on ‘R&D expenditure to stimulate hightechnology manufacturing’ when, as he observed, ‘most export growth still
appears to be occurring around traditional export and new industries of
tourism and services exports rather than high-technology manufactures’
(Gregory, 1993: 348).
Australia’s innovation policies are bound to consider the following
aspects of the innovation system.
• The importance of innovation capabilities in small firms; the lack of
support from local large innovative companies; and the technological
and economic dominance of TNCs.
• The importance of the publicly funded ‘science base’ which has
supported the agriculture and natural resource sectors and has
underpinned successful commercialisation in e.g. biomedical
enterprises.
• The inter-relatedness of the different industry sectors and the crucial
importance for Australia of the diffusion of value-adding through
innovation and learning to all sectors of the economy (see (Lundvall,
1992). An example is the importance to a growing knowledge-based
services sector of an innovative and export oriented primary industries
and manufacturing;
• Given the strength of the science base and the potential for linkage
between industry sectors, the need for collaboration in research,
innovation and commercialisation. Increasingly innovation must be
seen as ‘a process of interaction between a range of players’ through
‘networks, clusters and “complexes” of activity’ (Marceau and
Manley, 2001).
• Particular structural weakness in Australia’s innovation system, such
as entrepreneurial capability in business and paucity of venture
capital.
• The federal dimension, i.e. the appropriate roles of national and local
institutions, including governments, but also including national
research councils and local universities and research institutes.
In my view, this implies that our support of the ‘science base’ while it must
recognise the ‘social shaping’ effect of local industries (Pavitt, 1998) is likely
to follow the model of the medium OECD countries. Policies aimed at
nurturing of business innovation on the other hand need to be more
creatively constructive, drawing upon the kinds of incentives used by both
industrialised and developing countries.
How then has the Australian innovation system evolved in recent years in
response to these challenges, what driving forces can be identified, and what
effect have the changes had? I look first at the performance of R&D in the
business and public sectors, and second at the effect of the suite of policies
Australia
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adopted by the current federal government for supporting business
innovation, the ‘science base’ and cross-sector collaboration.

SECTORAL CHANGES IN AUSTRALIAN R&D
EXPENDITURE AND FUNDING
Expenditure on R&D by sector
Table 2 shows expenditure on R&D by business, government and higher
education sectors for the period 1994-95 to 2002-03. In contrast to the 1980s
and early 1990s, a period which saw rapid growth in business R&D and the
ascendancy of the higher education sector (Garrett-Jones, 2004), only modest
structural change is seen in the performance of R&D in the most recent
decade. However, some of these earlier trends were sustained.
National expenditure on R&D (GERD) was almost static, at around 1.6
per cent of GDP. While GERD grew by nearly 30 per cent in real terms over
the period to reach A$12.25 billion (Dept. of Education Science and
Training, 2004b), this growth merely matched Australia’s overall economic
growth during the same time (averaging 3.5 per cent per annum from 1993 to
2003)(Dept. of Education Science and Training, 2004a). Thus R&D
expenditure remained virtually unchanged as a proportion of GDP over the
whole period (see Table 2). At 1.62 per cent of GDP in 2002-03, Australia
was a middle ranking R&D performer, spending well below the European
Union (15 country) and OECD averages of 1.9 and 2.3 per cent of GDP
respectively (Dept. of Education Science and Training, 2004b).
R&D expenditure by business was cyclical, in response to general
economic conditions, and in 2002-03 stood at nearly 0.8 per cent of GDP. It
peaked at the start of the period in 1995-95 and in 2001-02, with a trough in
expenditure centred on 1999-2000. This pattern is explained by a decline in
R&D expenditures in the manufacturing industries and, to a lesser extent, the
mining sector. Research expenditure in other industry sectors continued to
grow strongly until 2001-02 (Dept. of Education Science and Training,
2004a). Almost two-thirds of manufacturing R&D expenditure was
contributed by ‘low technology’ and ‘medium low technology’ industries
and this figure changed little over the period 1995 to 2000. R&D expenditure
by the ‘high technology’ industries grew from 17 per cent of manufacturing
BERD to 21 per cent over the same period (Dept. of Education Science and
Training, 2004a). By 2002-03, BERD had recovered to 0.79 per cent of
GDP, but still stood well below the 1995-96 peak of 0.86 per cent.
The period also saw a continued strong decline in government
expenditure on R&D in its own laboratories (GOVERD), both at the federal
and state level. Just over 20 years ago, in 1981, the federal government was
the largest R&D performer in Australia. In 2002-03, R&D expenditure by the
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central and state governments combined ranked behind that by the business
and higher education sectors at 0.33% of GDP.

Australia
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Table 2. R&D expenditure by sector of performance, 1994-95 to 2002-03

Sector

Business
Commonwealth Govt.
State/Terr. Govt.
Higher education
Private non-profit
Subtotal: Comm +
State Govt
Subtotal: Govt +
Higher education
Total GERD

10

% of GDP
1994–95
0.74
0.25
0.17
0.39
0.03

1995-96
0.86

1996-97
0.80
0.24
0.15
0.44
0.04

1997-98
0.75

1998-99
0.69
0.20
0.15
0.43
0.04

19992000
0.65

2000-01
0.74
0.21
0.14
0.42
0.04

2001-02
0.81

2002-03
0.79
0.20
0.13
0.45
0.05

Change
19952003
2003-04
0.89
6.5%
-19.8%
-24.1%
17.1%
47.1%

0.42

0.39

0.35

0.35

0.33

-21.5%

0.81
1.58

0.83
1.66

0.78
1.51

0.77
1.55

0.78
1.62

-2.9%
2.5%

Australia

Table 2 (continued)
Sector

Business
Commonwealth Govt.
State/Terr. Govt.
Higher education
Private non-profit
Subtotal: Comm +
State Govt
Subtotal: Govt +
Higher education
Total GERD

% of GERD
1994–95
47.0%
16.0%
10.5%
24.5%
2.0%

1996-97
48.2%
14.4%
9.1%
26.2%
2.1%

1998-99
45.9%
13.2%
9.7%
28.7%
2.5%

2000-01
47.8%
13.5%
9.1%
26.8%
2.8%

2002-03
48.8%
12.5%
7.8%
28.0%
2.9%

Change
1995-2003
3.9%
-21.8%
-26.0%
14.3%
43.5%

26.5%

23.5%

22.9%

22.6%

20.3%

-23.4%

51.0%

49.7%

51.6%

49.4%

48.3%

-5.3%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

-

Source: (Australian Bureau of Statistics, various years-a; Australian Bureau of Statistics, various years-b; Dept. of Education
Science and Training, 2004a; Dept. of Education Science and Training, 2004b)
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The recent period has seen continuing growth in the contribution of higher
education to national R&D (HERD). By 1996-97 higher education R&D had
overtaken GOVERD to become and the second largest R&D performer after
business. In 2002-03 HERD reached a peak of 0.45 per cent of GDP. Yet,
looking at the public sector as a whole, the decline in government R&D has
not been countered by the expansion of R&D investments in the universities.
Overall then, one sees an erosion of publicly performed R&D between 199495 and 2002-03. Despite the growth in higher education R&D, overall
expenditure on publicly performed R&D (government + higher education)
fell by about three per cent from 0.81 per cent of GDP to 0.78 per cent over
the period.
Cross-sector funding of R&D
The federal government provides by far the majority of public funding for
R&D. It contributed about 86 per cent of higher education R&D funding in
2002-03, a slight reduction on the 89 per cent of HERD funded in 1994-95
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, various years).
Table 3. Intramural and extramural Business R&D funding, 1994-95 to
2002-03
Sector
Business
Commonwealth
Govt.
State/Terr. Govt.
Higher education
Private non-profit
Sub total Govt
Sub total
ex Business
Total

% of Business funded R&D
1994–95
1996-97
94.3%
93.6%

1998-99
92.8%

2000-01
94.0%

2002-03
94.1%

2.5%
0.9%
1.9%
0.4%
3.4%

1.8%
1.0%
2.9%
0.7%
2.8%

1.8%
1.4%
3.3%
0.7%
3.2%

1.6%
1.1%
2.8%
0.4%
2.7%

1.4%
0.9%
3.1%
0.6%
2.3%

5.7%
100.0%

6.4%
100.0%

7.2%
100.0%

6.0%
100.0%

5.9%
100.0%

Source: (Australian Bureau of Statistics, various years-a)

Business funding of R&D in the public sector has increased and has been
directed preferentially to the universities. As Table 3 shows, about 94 per
cent of business expenditure on R&D is spent intramurally or with other
businesses. Of the remainder, the universities have received about 3 per cent
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of business funding in the most recent survey years, an increase from around
2 per cent in 1994-95. By contrast, the proportion of business funds flowing
to the government sector has declined consistently through the period.
Business funds to the federal government agencies fell from 2.5 per cent in
1994-95 to 1.4 per cent of all business-funded R&D in 2002-03.
In summary, over the decade to 2003, Australia experienced no sustained
growth in expenditure on R&D as a proportion of national wealth. Business
R&D expenditure was no greater than it was in the mid 1990s. The
importance of the government research agencies continued to decline, while
that of the higher education sector grew. Overall, there was a fall in public
sector R&D which was not offset by increased business expenditures. The
patterns of cross-sector funding by businesses suggests that R&D within the
universities became more important to Australian businesses, while that in
government laboratories was viewed as less relevant.

CASE STUDY – INNOVATION POLICY UNDER THE
CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The general election of November 2004 returned the Howard conservative
Liberal-National coalition (first elected in March 1996) for a fourth term as
Australia’s federal government Moreover, the electorate delivered the
government control of the federal upper house, the Senate, ensuring passage
of Howard’s controversial reforms in the areas of higher education,
telecommunications policy and industrial relations. Yet all State and
Territory governments remained controlled by the opposition Australian
Labor Party (ALP).
In practice, for the last 15-20 years, both conservative and labour
governments in Australia have followed a strongly neo-liberal approach to
science and innovation policy, albeit one tempered by political pragmatism.
Under the current federal government, the pendulum has swung to the market
end of the spectrum of market driven and interventionist policies – what Fred
Argy has called ‘hard liberalism’, although perhaps less so than rhetoric
might suggest. In opposition, the ALP proposed an alternative agenda in
2001 to develop a ‘knowledge nation’, based on, inter alia, enhanced
education opportunities, strengthening of ‘great national institutions’ like
CSIRO, and ‘a transformed national culture emphasising knowledge,
excellence and innovation’ (Jones, 2001). The ALP’s task force also
recommended a doubling of national expenditure on R&D by 2010.
The Howard government’s main claim is less visionary but perhaps a
more practical one in ‘providing an economic climate in which innovation
can thrive’ (Howard, 2001). The government points to tax reforms, lower
company tax and a more flexible labour market as contributing to a
competitive economic environment with high growth, high productivity and
Australia

13

low inflation (Howard, 2001). But Howard’s term has also seen
comprehensive reviews of federal policies and initiatives for research and
innovation in business, the universities, the government research agencies
and research councils (see Table 5). By 2004, the Prime Minister was in a
position to announce that ‘I have identified science and innovation as one of
the Government’s strategic policy priorities’ and that the government’s goal
was ‘for Australia to build a world-class innovation system’ (Dept. of
Education Science and Training, 2004c). However, those who read this as
increased federal funding for research and innovation were to be
disappointed.

Government outlays for science and innovation
The trends in federal government outlays for science and innovation (Table
4) tell part of the story. Over the decade 1996 to 2005 Commonwealth
government outlays grew by a mere 12.5 per cent in real terms to reach
around A$5 billion (at 2002-03 prices). The business enterprise sector was
the biggest loser of government support. Outlays for business research and
innovation fell by 26 per cent in real terms over the decade, reflecting cuts to
the tax concession for industry R&D (see below). The federal research
agencies gained a very modest growth in budget allocations of around 11 per
cent over the period (Table 4a). Funding for the Defence S&T Organisation
(DSTO) however fell by 13 per cent in real terms. Funds for research in the
higher education sector increased by 22 per cent, while what the government
terms ‘multi-sector’ funding showed the greatest growth at 65 per cent over
the decade. This ‘multi-sector’ category comprises both support cross-sector
R&D arrangements such as the Cooperative Research Centres (CRC)
Program (approaching A$200 million annually in 2002-03 prices), as well as
funding sources which are open to competitive bids from both universities
and other public sector research agencies (and in some cases businesses),
notably the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) grants
(about A$400 million annually) and the rural R&D corporation funds (also
around A$200 million annually) (Dept. of Education Science and Training,
2004a).
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Table 4. Commonwealth Government outlays for science and innovation, 1995-96 to 2004-05

1995-96
(a) A$ million (chain volume
measures, 2002-03)
Major Federal Research
Agencies (1)
1,069.0
Business Enterprise Sector
1,107.3
Higher Education Sector
1,746.5
Multi-Sector (2)
530.2
Total Comm. Govt. outlays
for S&I
4,453.0
(b)% of Comm. Govt. outlays for S&I
Major Federal Research
Agencies
24.0%
Business Enterprise Sector
24.9%
Higher Education Sector
39.2%
Multi-Sector
11.9%
100.0%

1996-97

1997-98

1998-99

1999-00

2000-01

2001-02

2002-03

est.
2003-04

est.
2004-05

Change
1995-96
to 200405

1,113.5
742.3
1,834.4
537.0

1,048.5
628.3
1,881.1
578.3

1,050.1
666.6
1,941.6
567.1

1,104.5
816.8
1,959.1
526.0

1,146.9
839.8
1,888.1
647.2

1,200.9
902.4
1,925.9
655.0

1,218.1
777.4
1,972.9
694.4

1,253.9
807.8
2,096.0
855.9

1,183.7
818.6
2,134.1
874.9

10.7%
-26.1%
22.2%
65.0%

4,227.2

4,136.2

4,225.4

4,406.4

4,522.0

4,684.2

4,662.8

5,013.6

5,011.3

12.5%

26.3%
17.6%
43.4%
12.7%
100.0%

25.3%
15.2%
45.5%
14.0%
100.0%

24.9%
15.8%
46.0%
13.4%
100.0%

25.1%
18.5%
44.5%
11.9%
100.0%

25.4%
18.6%
41.8%
14.3%
100.0%

25.6%
19.3%
41.1%
14.0%
100.0%

26.1%
16.7%
42.3%
14.9%
100.0%

25.0%
16.1%
41.8%
17.1%
100.0%

23.6%
16.3%
42.6%
17.5%
100.0%

-1.6%
-34.3%
8.6%
46.6%
-
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Table 4 (continued)
(c)% of GDP
Major Federal Research
Agencies
Business Enterprise Sector
Higher Education Sector
Multi-Sector
Comm. Govt. outlays as%
of GDP

0.18
0.19
0.30
0.09

0.18
0.12
0.30
0.09

0.17
0.10
0.30
0.09

0.16
0.10
0.29
0.09

0.16
0.12
0.28
0.08

0.16
0.12
0.27
0.09

0.16
0.12
0.26
0.09

0.16
0.10
0.26
0.09

0.16
0.10
0.27
0.11

0.15
0.10
0.26
0.11

-19.7%
-46.4%
-11.4%
19.6%

0.76

0.70

0.66

0.64

0.64

0.64

0.64

0.62

0.64

0.62

-18.4%

Source: (Dept. of Education Science and Training, 2004a), Table 3.1.2.
Notes: (1) DSTO, CSIRO and other R&D agencies; (2) Including NHMRC and other health support, rural funds and CRCs.
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As a proportion of federal spending, the government research agencies as a
whole retained their budget share at about 24 per cent of outlays through the
period (Table 4b), while the ‘multi-sector’ competitive grants and the higher
education sector received an increased proportion of outlays. Overall, the
increase in government outlays was substantially below the rate of economic
growth over the decade. As a result outlays on science and innovation
programs declined by more than 18 per cent over the period when expressed
as a proportion of GDP. All sectors, apart from the ‘multi-sector’ category
showed a decline in funding as a proportion of GDP over the decade.
In summary, federal government outlays on science and innovation more
than kept pace with inflation over the period 1995-2004. However, they fell
by more than 18 per cent as a share of national wealth. The government
reallocated funds in two ways. First was to divert funds away from the
business sector and towards the public sector – notably to the universities
and the ‘multi-sector’ funding agencies. Second was a diversion from direct
funding channels – particularly to the government research agencies – to
indirect competitive funding schemes.
Government policies and incentives for science and innovation
Given the broad budgetary approach to science and innovation outlined
above, how has this been achieved in practice? Table 5 summarises
chronologically the main science and innovation initiatives over the period of
the current federal government. Policy statements and funding initiatives of
the government are covered, as are independent, government commissioned
reviews and House of Representatives inquiries. Inquiries by the Senate are
excluded because the government did not command a majority there during
most of the period under review. I have excluded some initiatives, especially
those specific to a particular industry sector.
Table 5 ventures a subjective assessment of the importance and impact of
each measure to the innovation sectors: business, government research,
higher education, and ‘cross-sectoral’ (i.e. promoting cross-sector linkages or
substantially affecting one or more of the previous sectors). This subjective
assessment (from one to three ‘stars’) is based on (a) the level of additional
funding actually committed; (b) the effective degree of implementation or
influence of the policy or recommendations; and (c) the extent of change in
the innovation system were the proposal to be fully implemented. A ‘three
star’ initiative has had a significant effect while a ‘one star’ is judged less
effective or with narrower impact. Let us consider the main trends in
government policy for each sector.
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Table 5. Major Federal Government science and innovation policy statements and initiatives, 1996-2004
Year/
Month
1996
1996 Nov
~1996
~1996
1997 June
1997 June

1997
July

18

Initiative
Tax concession for industry R&D
reduced from 150% to 125%; tax
syndicates curtailed.
R&D Start Program established
Strategic Partnership Industry
Development Agreements Program
(replaced 2002)
Pooled Development Funds (PDF)
retained (est. 1992)
‘Going for Growth’ (Mortimer
Report) released
‘Priority Matters’ report by the
Chief Scientist (Stocker, 1997)

‘The Global Information Economy:
The Way Ahead’ (Goldsworthy
Report) released (Information
Industries Taskforce, 1997)

Main measures

GR

BE

Reduction in revenue foregone thorough the tax concession; tightening of
eligibility

***

R&D Start grants;
Graduate Program for small firms
Agreements with major ICT suppliers on R&D and supply chain
development

***

Support for local venture capital industry

**

Rationalisation of R&D and innovation assistance to business; major
changes to innovation program administration
Recommendations on organisational arrangements for public S&T; and for
setting national priorities: ‘The Government should articulate a preferred
vision for Australia’s development toward national goals in the spheres of
economic and industry development, quality of the environment, and social
well-being’ … ‘This national-level identification of priorities should
concentrate on the structural level’
Recommended creation of Information Industries Minister and Council

Australia

HE

XS
**

*

*

*

**

*

*

*

Year/
Month
1997
1997
Dec
1997
1998 Apr
1998 Apr
1998

1999

Initiative
Innovation Investment Fund (IIF)
Government Statement: ‘Investing
for Growth’ (Australian
Government, 1997)
Cooperative Research Centres
Program retained (est. 1990)
Australian Greenhouse Office
(AGO) established
Report of the review of higher
education financing and policy
released (West Report)
Review of greater
commercialisation and self funding
in the Cooperative Research
Centres Programme released
(Mercer and Stocker, 1998)
‘Inquiry into the effects on research
and development of public policy
reform in the past decade’ (House
of Representatives Standing
Committee on Industry Science and
Resources, 1999)

Main measures

GR

Access to equity capital
A range of industry incentives including funding for R&D grants, venture
capital and technology diffusion: Extension of R&D Start Program;
Expansion of IIF program
Industry sectoral ‘Action Agendas’
Nine funding rounds 1990-2004

**

Funds for greenhouse research

*

BE

*

**

***

**

Support for CRC program; increase user input to governance; develop core
performance indicators for all CRCs

Australia

XS

**
**

Strategic planning, priority setting and coordination for university
research; ‘student centred’ funding

Maintain funding for CRC Program – govt. response agreed; Address HE
research infrastructure needs;
Counter the decline in BERD – govt. noted.

HE

**

*
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Year/
Month
1999
1999
early
1999 May
1999 July
1999 July
1999 July
1999 Nov
1999 Jun,
Dec

20

Initiative
Increase in length of patent
protection for pharmaceuticals to 25
years
‘The Virtuous Cycle’ report (Wills
Report) released (Health and
Medical Research Strategic
Review, 1999) and Govt. response.
Biotechnology Australia established
Pharmaceutical Industry Investment
Program (PIIP)
(ceased July 2004)
Shipbuilding Innovation Scheme
Building Information Technology
Strengths (BITS) (ceased June
2004)
Commercialising Emerging
Technologies
(COMET) scheme established
‘New Knowledge, New
Opportunities’ Discussion paper;
and ‘Knowledge and Innovation: a
policy statement on research and
research training’ Higher Education
White Paper (Kemp, 1999).

Main measures

GR

BE

HE

XS

*
Doubling of competitive funding for health and medical R&D under
NHMRC

Compensation for reduced pharmaceutical prices under Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme
Replacement for ‘Factor f’ program
Benefit for eligible R&D
Seed capital for ICT start-up companies
Support to enable individuals, early growth firms and spin-off companies
from public sector research institutions to manage innovation and
commercialisation.
University reforms, performance based funding for research student places
(i.e. greater competition for PhD and Masters research students),
requirement for annual Research and Research Training Management
reports, establishment of independent Australian Research Council;
encouragement of commercialisation and ‘an entrepreneurial culture
among researchers’

Australia
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*
**

**

*

*
**
**
***

Year/
Month
2000
2000 Feb
-

2000 July
2000 July
2000 July
2000 Nov

Initiative
Copyright Amendment
National Innovation Summit
convened with Business Council of
Australia; Report of the Innovation
Summit Implementation Group
(Miles Report) (Innovation Summit
Implementation Group, 2000)
National Biotechnology Strategy
announced
Textile, Clothing and Footwear
Strategic Investment Program
Contract awarded for construction
of ‘OPAL’ nuclear research reactor
Chief Scientist’s report ‘The
Chance to Change’ released
(Batterham, 2000)

Main measures

GR

BE

Comprehensive reform of Copyright Act to account for digital
technologies
The Summit produced at least 140 recommendations about many aspects
of the innovation that were distilled to 24 by the ISIG. Many were picked
up subsequently by the Science Capability Review and the BAA statement.

*

Biotechnology Innovation Fund (BIF) established

*

R&D grants

*

‘OPAL’ replacement research reactor for ANSTO. Construction
commenced in 2002 for full commissioning in 2006
Outcome of the Australian Science Capability Review. Recommendations
include: incr. in science students and postdoctoral fellows; incr. funds for
ARC and research infrastructure; expansion of CRC Program; better IP
management by universities and government agencies. Themes of
investment in culture, ideas and commercialisation.

Australia

HE

XS

**

***

**

*
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**

**

Year/
Month
2001 Jan

2001 May
2002
Feb

22

Initiative

Main measures

The government’s major policy
statement ‘Backing Australia’s
Ability: An Innovation Action Plan
for the Future’ (‘BAA 1’),
promising ‘A$2.9 bill. of additional
funding over 5 years’ (Australian
Government, 2001)

Access to pre-seed funding for development of commercial proposals;
review of access to government funded research; Ministerial Committee to
implement BAA; explicit National Research Priorities (NRP) to be
developed
National Innovation Awareness Strategy; 175% ‘premium’ tax concession
for ‘additional’ R&D; Innovation Access Program; expansion of (COMET)
program; New Industries Development Program (rural and regional
businesses); continuation of R&D Start Program
2000 Additional university places annually in ICT, mathematics and
science; loans scheme for postgraduate students; support for research
infrastructure; Access to pre-seed funding
Doubling of ARC grant funding over 5 years; Centres of Excellence in ICT
and Biotechnology; increased funding for Cooperative Research Centres;
A$155 mill. for 15 new ‘collaborative’ Major National Research Facilities
(Aug 2001); Systemic Infrastructure Initiative

Low cost ‘innovation patent’
introduced
ARC Priority Areas announced

GR
**

BE
**

HE
*

**
Priority areas for ARC and for new Centres of Excellence (initial 5-year
funding) are:
Nanomaterials and Biomaterials;
Genome/Phenome Research;
Complex/Intelligent System; and
Photon Science and Technology

Australia
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**

XS
**

Year/
Month
2002
April

2002
June-Dec

2002 Sept
2002 Dec
2002
Dec
2003

Initiative
‘Higher Education at the
Crossroads’ – Ministerial
discussion paper. Review of Higher
Education system announced.
(Nelson, 2002a)
First CSIRO Flagships announced;
internal restructure

External Earnings Targets for
government research agencies
abolished (Batterham, 2002)
Automobile Competitiveness and
Investment Scheme (ACIS)
renewed
National Research Priorities (NRP)
announced
National Innovation Council est.
(Chair: David Miles)

Main measures

GR

BE

Not specifically on research, but set the government agenda for higher
education. Proposes more ‘user pays’; deregulation of student fees;

At the time of writing, the Flagships are:
Preventative Health
Light Metals
Food Futures
Energy Transformed
Water for a Healthy Country
Wealth from Oceans
Targets of around 30% of funding from non-appropriation sources
commenced in 1988

***

*

**

Competitive R&D grants and allowances
Priorities are: An Environmentally Sustainable Australia, Promoting and
Maintaining Good Health, Frontier Technologies for Building and
Transforming Australian Industries, and Safeguarding Australia
Advisory Council to the Minister for Industry; Responsible for funding
under the National Innovation Awareness Strategy

Australia
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*
**

*
*
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XS

Year/
Month
2003 May

Initiative
‘Our Universities – Backing
Australia’s Future’ Ministerial
Statement released

2003 June

House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Science
and Innovation report: ‘Riding the
Innovation Wave: The Case for
Increasing Business Investment in
R&D’ (Australia. House of
Representatives Standing
Committee on Science and
Innovation, 2003) (Australian
Government, 2004)

2003 Aug

Howard Partners evaluation of CRC
Program released
Pharmaceuticals Partnership
Program (P3) launched; first grants
commence July 2004
‘Mapping Australian Science and
Innovation’ (MASI) report released
(Australian Government, 2003)

2003 Sept
2003 Nov

24

Main measures
Increased student fees; introduced student loan; Announced reviews of
collaboration between universities and publicly funded research agencies;
higher education research funding schemes; and development of a national
research infrastructure strategy
Rec. that federal govt. encourages state and local government to promote
R&D; more commercial focus for R&D Corporations Recommendations
include: expansion of innovation mentoring services for SMEs; tax offsets
for R&D by TNCs in Australia; voluntary sector levies on SMEs to fund
R&D; simplify federal R&D support to firms and provide 5 year continuity
for programs; expand incremental/premium tax concession and link to
NRPs; Incr. funding for START and COMET programs
Make university superannuation more flexible to allow staff to move to
businesses; Expand Graduate START; monitor access of regional
universities to CRC program.
Incr. no. of ‘research brokers’; Develop guidelines for public/private
collaborative R&D
Recommends continuation of the CRC Program, but with more focus on
research as an ‘investment vehicle’
Replaces PIIP
Competitive program: companies receive 30 cents per additional dollar of
eligible R&D;
A major review of Australia’s science and innovation strengths and
weaknesses; frank in its findings; supported by a range of case studies.

Australia

GR

BE

HE

*

***

*

*

XS
*

**
*
*

Year/
Month
2004 Mar

Initiative

Main measures

GR

Reports of three reviews of higher
education research released. (Dept.
of Education Science and Training,
2004d; Dept. of Education Science
and Training, 2004e); (National
Research Infrastructure Taskforce,
2004)

Closer collaboration between universities and major publicly funded
research agencies (McGauchie) – recommends performance assessment
framework for universities and public research agencies
Evaluation of Knowledge and Innovation reforms (Fell); and
National Research Infrastructure Taskforce (Sargent) - recommends
establishment of NRI Council

**

2004 May

Backing Australia’s Ability:
Building our future through science
and innovation (‘BAA 2’) policy
statement released

**

2004 Oct

Industry Cooperative Innovation
Program

2004 Oct

Commercial Ready Program
commences
Grant Committee report on
NHMRC released
CSIRO’s Flagship Collaboration
Fund launched
11 new ARC Centres of Excellence
announced

Funds for CSIRO National Flagships Initiative; improvement in
monitoring quality of achievements
Commercial Ready program replaces R&D Start, BIF and elements of the
Innovation Access programs; improvement in monitoring quality of
achievements; Incr. Funds for NHMRC and ARC; CRC program to be
more commercially focused; National Collaborative Research
Infrastructure Strategy
Support cooperative projects by firms to develop and use new
technologies, with priority being given to projects meeting strategic
industry needs identified through an industry ‘Action Agenda’.
Replaces R&D Start, BIF and parts of Innovation Access Program
Overhaul of NHMRC recommended to align with changes recommended
by Wills Review
‘Enhanced collaborative research between universities, the CSIRO and
other publicly funded research agencies’.
Articulated with NRP areas

*

2004 Dec
2005 Aug
2005 Aug

Australia
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HE

XS

**

**

**

*

*
**

*

**
**
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Year/
Month
2005 Feb,
Sept

2005 Sept

26

Initiative
Expert Advisory Group set up
under Roberts (former UK HE
Funding Council)
Research Quality Framework’
Preferred Model’ released
National Collaborative Research
Infrastructure Strategy (NCRIS)
standing committee established

Main measures
Development of ‘Quality and Accessibility Frameworks’ for Publicly
Funded Research

Australia

GR

BE

HE

**

***

*

**

XS

*

BUSINESS INNOVATION
In the lead up to the 1996 election the then shadow science minister observed
that the single most important obstacle to Australia’s progress as a
competitive technologically competent nation is our low level of industrial
R&D (Hill, 1996). Business was therefore surprised that the first act of the
Howard government on gaining office was to cut back drastically the
existing incentives for industrial research and development. In June 1996 the
tax concession for industry R&D was reduced from 150 per cent to 125 per
cent, largely on the grounds that the budgetary cost of the concession – and
particularly the access allowed to syndicates of firms – was impossible to
control. With changes to concession rate and eligibility (as well as general
company tax reductions) this had an immediate effect on the cost to the
government of the tax concession, reducing it from around A$950 million in
1995-96 (in 2002-03 prices) to less than A$600 million the following year
(Australian Government, 2003). A ‘premium’ tax concession rate of 175 per
cent was introduced for incremental (additional) R&D in 2001. However,
since 2001-02 the value of the R&D tax concessions to industry has stood at
less than A$400 million annually (at 2002-03 prices)(Dept. of Education
Science and Training, 2004a).
Industry was partially recompensed by a growth in targeted grant
programs such as the R&D Start scheme (now part of the ‘Commercial
Ready’ program). The value of these programs grew by over 150 per cent
over the period to stand at about A$150 million in 2004-05 (Dept. of
Education Science and Training, 2004a). However, grants and loans did not
make up the shortfall caused by changes to the tax concession and, as noted,
since 1996, government support for research and innovation in firms has
fallen by 26 per cent (Table 4). New policies have concentrated on the
‘downstream’ end of innovation, such as through the Innovation Investment
Fund (investment equity), ‘pre-seed’ project funding, the ‘COMET’ program
and continued support for the local venture capital industry.
To its credit, the government has promoted an active debate on
innovation policy, through in the ‘Innovation Summit’ sponsored with the
Business Council of Australia in 2001 and through the two ‘Backing
Australia’s Ability’ (BAA) white papers (Australian Government, 2001;
Dept. of Education Science and Training, 2004c). Three themes can be
identified in this discourse.
The first is the debate between strategic intervention and a ‘hands off’
laissez faire approach. Jonathon West (2004) characterises the prevalent
policymakers’ view as ‘innovation should be driven by the market… if the
market does not support innovation, so be it’. In retort, West points to the
low level of support for education and basic research and limited attractors
for capturing the profits from innovation and concludes that ‘it should be
apparent that the market alone will not come to the nation’s rescue’ (West,
Australia
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2004). Phillip Bullock, the head of IBM Australia/New Zealand, recently
agreed: ‘We can conclude that relying on market-driven funding for
innovation is not working’ (Bullock, 2004) (page no.). The government’s
own commendable ‘Mapping Australian Science and Innovation’ exercise
commented that government support for business R&D in Australia was low
by international standards, being less than half that of the leading OECD
countries ( Australian Government, 2003:23).
How this debate has played out can be illustrated by two early reports that
the government commissioned. Arguing for a National Information
Industries Strategy, the Goldsworthy report warned of a ‘new century of
technological colonisation’ if Australia did not act (Information Industries
Taskforce, 1997). The report’s suggested ‘actions’ were predominantly
interventionist. Mortimer’s review of business programs for investment,
innovation and export, on the other hand, took a far more wary approach to
government intervention in the form of financial assistance to business.
While he recommended that government incentives be combined to form a
single Innovation Program, he favoured uniform incentives for all firms,
rather than programs targeted at particular industries or classes of firms (like
SMEs). He was especially critical of schemes which produced ‘private
benefit’ for firms and recommended the termination of CRCs which fell into
this category and retention of the CRC Program only for ‘public good’
research (Review of Business Programs, 1997). The government largely
rejected Mortimer’s prescriptions and treated Goldsworthy’s more
favourably. Targets in Mortimer’s sights like AusIndustry, the Industry R&D
Board and the CRC Program were retained rather than abolished, while new
initiatives like the Building IT Strengths (BITS) incubator program, National
ICT Australia (NICTA) and, for a while, a National Office of the
Information Economy promoted innovation in the information industries.
The second theme within government support for innovation has been the
balance of programs between the largest firms (including TNCs) and SMEs.
The Start program and the Innovation Investment Fund were aimed mainly at
small firms unable to take advantage of the tax concession. Multinational
firms in the pharmaceuticals, information technology and automobile
industries have also been recruited to strategic partnership or industry
restructuring schemes with targets for R&D and innovation. These have not
met with unqualified success. In 2002, Ericsson pulled out of R&D in
Australia, closing its Asia-Pacific Lab, and firms such as Kodak and Nissan
have ceased local manufacturing.
The third debate might be termed that between the ‘old economy’ and the
‘new economy’. Government innovation programs in recent years have
various promoted the development of new technology-based industries as
well as supporting currently competitive industries through for example the
rural industry Research Corporations. At the national level, Australia faces a
version of the ‘innovators dilemma’ (Christensen, 1997): that is, how to
pursue successful innovation in established, essential industry sectors like
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agriculture and mineral resources while at the same time backing
developments in the ‘next big thing’ in technologies or markets. Here
Australia is not alone. As Keith Smith comments, ‘Within most OECD
economies, policymakers remain heavily focused on ICT, biotech and
nanotechnology issues (both in innovation and diffusion policy) to the
exclusion of most of the areas of knowledge that are, in fact, producing
change across major industries. Policy remains focused on a science-based
model of innovation to the exclusion of a genuinely learning-based
approach’ (Smith, 2004). (Page no.)
The frequent changes to industry innovation incentives shown in Table 5
to some extent reflect an experimental approach to the challenge of imbuing
a learning and innovation culture throughout the economy. However, firms
have found the changes in schemes and eligibility confusing, prompting a
Parliamentary Committee to recommend their simplification and longer
continuity (Australia. House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Science and Innovation, 2003).
While particular initiatives like Start appear to have been effective, it is
hard to discern an overall ‘vision’ for industrial innovation policy,
notwithstanding the Innovation Summit’s ‘blueprint for change’ (Innovation
Summit Implementation Group, 2000). Overall, the Howard government’s
assistance for innovation in industry can be criticised for its lack of stability,
its inconsistency and meagreness.

PUBLIC SECTOR R&D
CSIRO, Australia’s iconic civil research agency, has a budget of around
A$900 million, including over A$300 million from business and other users.
Yet policy has tended to view government-performed research as a negative
factor in innovation performance (see (Stern and Gans, 2003). Much of the
policy rhetoric, for example in the ‘Backing Australia’s Ability’ statements is
about ‘commercialising’ public sector R&D rather than about its public
good:
Backing Australia’s Ability will assist the greater commercial
application of research from universities and public sector research
agencies, like the CSIRO, by encouraging the commercial linkages with
industry and removing impediments for promising research to go
forward to the stage of commercial viability. (Howard, 2001) (Page no.)
The federal government has not treated its own research agencies kindly,
expecting them to supplement static or declining government funding
through industry partnerships or competitive grant funds. In Senate Estimates
Committee hearings in 2003, Geoff Garrett, chief executive of CSIRO, said
that one of the organisation’s key strategic messages had been ‘partner or
Australia
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perish’ (CSIRO, 2004). How far this had become ingrained was reflected in
the abolition of formal ‘external earnings targets’ in 2002 (Batterham, 2002),
presumably on the basis that such targets were no longer necessary.
In 2002 CSIRO started to restructure its research programs around a
series of ‘National Research Flagships’, which are heralded as ‘a major
refocussing’ of CSIRO’s research and commercialisation activities:
‘Flagships are multidisciplinary research partnerships that align
Divisions across CSIRO and external agencies to tackle big,
audacious goals in areas of major national significance. Their larger
scale, longer timeframes and clear focus on adoption of research
outputs are designed to maximise their impact on their goals.’
(www.csiro.au)
CSIRO plans ultimately to allocate about 40 per cent of its resources to the
Flagships (CSIRO, 2004). Despite the promise of new government funds for
the Flagships (Dept. of Education Science and Training, 2004c), in mid 2003
the CSIRO Staff Association reportedly accused the government of ‘doing a
demolition job’ on CSIRO: ‘The Government’s program of neglect and longterm cutbacks have caused the biggest crisis in CSIRO’s history. Staff… fear
for the future viability of the organisation and its vital research work’, the
president of association is quoted as saying (Anon., 2003). It can be argued
that the Flagship structure makes the future break-up of CSIRO, along the
lines of the New Zealand model of research institutes, more feasible.
Spurred by Chief Scientist John Stocker’s report ‘Priority Matters’
(Stocker, 1997), the setting of research priorities forms a second theme in
government policy toward public sector R&D. The government has made a
significant push to integrate the research effort of the government
laboratories and to some extent the universities through priority setting,
through evaluation of their outcomes and more recently through the proposed
application of common quality assessment frameworks for research (RQF).
Four broad national research priorities (NRPs) were announced by the
federal government in 2002 (see Table). These had been foreshadowed in the
government’s major policy document ‘Backing Australia’s Ability’ in 2001.
The original NRPs were developed following a consultation process under
Jim Peacock, respected bioscientist and head of the Australian Academy of
Science, 3 and the subsidiary goals were expanded following representations
by social sciences and humanities research leaders in early 2003. Each
federal agency (including the research councils) is required to report
annually on how their investments align with the national research priorities.
The CSIRO Flagships have come to be ‘closely aligned with the
Government’s National Research Priorities and build on CSIRO’s core
science capability’ (CSIRO, 2004). Similarly, proposals for the ARC’s
3

Peacock was appointed federal Chief Scientist in February 2006.
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30

Centres of Excellence are now tied to the NRPs. Clearly agencies like
CSIRO will be assessing the viability of programs that do not demonstrably
fall within the NRP areas.
Since 1999, all federal government research agencies have been subject
to Output Pricing Reviews by the Department of Finance and Administration
(DOFA). These reviews examine the quantity, quality and price of outputs
produced in an attempt to assess whether the government is getting good
value for the taxpayers’ funds. The process emphasises indicators of agency
outputs and outcomes. The framework sensibly recognises that research
agencies are valued as much for their standing capacity to deliver research
expertise as for their specific R&D activities and the Reviews have been
largely qualitative in nature. Following the recommendations of the
McGauchie review of 2004 (Dept. of Education Science and Training,
2004e) there have been moves to standardise the reporting of research
outcomes through the development of a ‘quality and accessibility framework’
for all publicly funded research (see below).
In Australia’s relatively small science system, finding capital for the
provision of major national research facilities has always been problematic.
The provision of major facilities and research infrastructure is a recurring
theme in federal government science policy. The current government has
perhaps achieved more that its predecessors in this regard. The major capital
project has been the construction and commissioning of a replacement
research reactor (Open Pool Australian Light-water, or OPAL) for the
Australian Nuclear S&T Organisation (ANSTO). Federal-State-university
collaboration has led to the construction of the Australian Synchrotron in
Melbourne, to open in 2007. The Sargent taskforce recommended the
establishment of a standing committee to address research infrastructure
needs (National Research Infrastructure Taskforce, 2004), and the
government has created a body to oversee a National Collaborative Research
Infrastructure Strategy (NCRIS).
In summary, the watchword for government research agencies over the
last decade has been to commercialise, to ‘partner or perish’ and to align
more closely with explicit national research priorities. This approach is now
being extended to the provision of major national research facilities and
research infrastructure for government laboratories and universities.

THE HIGHER EDUCATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH
SECTORS
The Howard government inherited the ‘unified national system’ of higher
education. It is important to note that ‘unified does not mean uniform’ to
paraphrase (Wood and Meek, 2002). Eight large, highly ‘research intensive’
universities dominate the system, and 8-10 more enjoy significant but
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restricted research strengths (Garrett-Jones et al., 2000). The former Minister
for Education and Science signalled a further concentration of research
funding, commenting ‘when you fund and administer [all universities] in the
exactly same way it is prescription for mediocrity’ (Nelson, 2002b). The
government has made some moves to support regional universities separately
such as through ‘regional protection funding’ for research, introduced in
2004. Overall, the policy has been to increase competition for research funds
(both grants and institutional funds) against a background of increased ‘user
pays’ for students.
The higher education sector saw substantial growth in research
expenditure over the decade from 1996 (see Table 2). During this period the
university system (and its research activity) was subject to almost continual
review. Roderick West’s broad review (Higher Education Financing and
Policy Review Committee, 1998) prompted the government’s ‘Knowledge
and Innovation’ white paper the following year (Kemp, 1999). This required
the universities to produce regular management plans for research and
research training and encouraged commercialisation by the universities. It
also increased performance based funding for research students. The 2002
‘Crossroads’ review of the higher education system led to a Ministerial
statement ‘Our Universities: Backing Australia’s Future’ (Nelson, 2003) that
announced three further reviews. These inquiries, which reported in 2004,
were in relation to enhanced collaboration between universities and
government research agencies (Dept. of Education Science and Training,
2004e); an assessment of the impact of the ‘Knowledge and Innovation’
reforms under Chris Fell (Dept. of Education Science and Training, 2004d),
and on research infrastructure (National Research Infrastructure Taskforce,
2004). Fell’s report found ‘that the sector has responded well to Knowledge
and Innovation and that the reforms are working as intended’ (p. vii).
However the report made several recommendations about increased funding,
more discretionary funds and greater emphasis on quality of outcomes.
Reviewing the status of higher education R&D in Australia, Wood and
Meek (2002) are highly critical of the Howard government’s policies. Rather
than a ‘stable and predictable’ policy environment, universities have been
subject to what they term the ‘weariness’ of constant review and
accountability. Initial cuts in funding made in 1996 – including reducing
operating grants and failure to provide supplementation for academic salary
increases – has had a ‘profound and largely negative effect’ (Wood and
Meek, 2002). Government funding for higher education declined from over
0.70 per cent of GDP in 1996-97 to less than 0.55 per cent in 2003-04 (Wood
and Meek, 2002). This has been somewhat offset by increased student fee
income and, to a smaller degree, commercial funding of research. However,
Wood and Meek see this as an abrogation of responsibility for public funding
of higher education but, more significantly, as handing the direction of the
universities over to the ‘vagaries’ of market forces. A report by the
(opposition controlled) Senate in late 2001 entitled ‘Universities in Crisis’
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recommended a significant expansion in public investment in higher
education. The government rejected the premise of a higher education
funding crisis. But concerns about under-funding of the universities and the
innovation system as a whole are echoed by senior academic managers. The
Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee criticised the second ‘Backing
Australia’s Ability’ (BAA2) white paper (Dept. of Education Science and
Training, 2004c) for not giving a clear plan for the national innovation
system and for failing to increase overall investment in research and
innovation (Anon., 2003). The AVCC itself has set a national ‘research and
innovation investment target’ of 2 per cent of GDP by 2010. The ViceChancellor of the Australian National University, Ian Chubb, is on record as
saying that BAA2 would see Australia ‘treading water’ in its capacity for
research and innovation over the next five years (Anon., 2004).
As providers of competitive funding to the universities and health
research institutions the main research councils have fared well under the
current government. Funds for the National Health and Medical Research
Council (NHMRC) doubled with the government’s response to the 1999
Wills Report (Health and Medical Research Strategic Review, 1999), while
the first ‘Backing Australia’s Ability’ statement (Australian Government,
2001) announced a doubling of funding to the ARC. Both councils have been
re-established as independent statutory bodies. Recommendations in the
West review encouraged the ARC in setting priorities within its own funding
programs. However, there was some criticism of the hasty announcement of
ARC priorities by the Education Minister in 2001, which set priorities for
about one-third of ARC’s grant budget and for the ARC Centres of
Excellence.
As noted, the government has announced the introduction of common
quality assessment frameworks for research (RQF) for the universities and
government agencies, for implementation from 2007. The RQF will replace
Australia’s unique form of ex post quantitative evaluation for higher
education research funding which gives weight to numbers of publications.
Linda Butler’s analysis ‘raises important questions on the wisdom of a policy
that rewards quantity, with scant regard to quality’ (Butler, 2003) (p 154).
Butler shows that Australian representation in the Science Citation Index
(SCI) increased by 25 per cent in the decade to 2001 (Butler, 2003). The
universities contributed an increasing proportion of these publications –
three-quarters in 2000, compared to two-thirds ‘historically’. By contrast,
Butler comments that ‘the government sector’s growth … evaporated in the
latter half of the 1990s’ (p 150) with CSIRO and hospitals showing a similar
trend. Of concern, despite the growth in output, the international research
community is paying less regard to these publications. Australia’s share of
the world’s ‘citation pool’ fell with respect to other OECD countries. As
Butler comments ‘Australia’s increase in output appears to be at the expense
of impact’ (p 147). Increasingly, it seems, academics are publishing in lower
impact journals.
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The RQF – along the lines of the UK Research Assessment Exercise – is
therefore cautiously welcomed. The unit of assessment is to be research
‘groupings’ nominated by the universities. The proposal was seen by the
former Minister as a mechanism for redistributing institutional research
funding from the Education ministry and influencing grant funding from the
research councils (Expert Advisory Group for the RQF, 2005), but the all
important ‘funding formula’ (how the quality assessments will be linked to
research funding) remains to be decided. It is also unclear how research
‘impacts’ will be assessed and used. Depending on how the proposals are
ultimately implemented they may well prompt further concentration of
research funding in the larger universities, effectively leading to a the
restoration of a two-tier higher education system in research.
On the positive side, then, competitive funding through the well-regarded
research councils has increased, and a more integrated approach to research
infrastructure embarked upon. The RQF may be a positive (but expensive)
step, but its ramifications are as yet unclear. Overall, though, the universities
are currently under immense pressure, facing new demands to become more
entrepreneurial, to expand their contribution to commercial outcomes and
cross-sector collaboration, resolving tensions between teaching and research,
and from the user pays philosophy. Essentially the universities are being
expected to continue to expand, to encompass a wider range of research and
innovation activities, and to adopt a more ‘market’ approach to education
within public funding that is actually falling as a proportion of GDP.

CROSS-SECTOR R&D
We have observed an evolution of cross-sector R&D collaboration in
Australia towards ‘formalised and structured arrangements’ (Garrett-Jones
and Turpin, 1997). This trend has continued under the current government.
Government policy constantly stresses the need to build linkages within the
national innovation system, particularly between the public sector and
industry. The second ‘Backing Australia’s Ability’ white paper for example
states that:
A fundamental objective of this package is to boost collaboration
between the key players in the innovation system: business,
universities and publicly funded research agencies. Collaboration
increases the ‘interconnectedness’ of the system, providing more
and varied pathways for research to be used and commercialised.
(Dept. of Education Science and Training, 2004c) Page no.
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The Cooperative Research Centres Program (CRC Program), which started
in 1990, is the Australian largest federal investment in cross-sector R&D.
There are currently more than 70 CRCs in operation. The Program links
different R&D sectors and institutions: universities, federal and State
government research authorities, individual firms, and industry-led public
sector intermediaries such as the rural R&D corporations. The program has
survived proposals to curtail it (Review of Business Programs, 1997) and
pressures for greater ‘self funding’ (Mercer and Stocker, 1998). While
Program objectives have from the outset promoted ‘the links between
research and its commercial and other applications’ (Slatyer, 1994), the
current objectives have ‘drifted significantly’ from the original ones (Howard
Partners, 2003). The government has, from 2004, required ‘a stronger
commercial focus’ through strong industry partners and plans for
commercialisation or utilisation.
The CRC Program is widely supported. It is credited with ‘changing
research cultures’ and promoting increased and more effective cross-sectoral,
multidisciplinary and multi-organisational research, technology development
and commercialisation (Howard and Partners, 2003). As a result the CRC has
become a dominant (if not the dominant) model for cross-sector R&D in
Australia, but a dominance which is now being challenged.
In 2003, the government announced new ‘national centres of excellence’
in biotechnology and information and communications technology outside
the CRC Program. Unlike the CRCs, where the research areas are proposed
by the participants, the scope of the new national centres was nominated by
government following consultation with scientists and industry. Cross-sector
R&D linkages are increasingly being supported by Australia’s research
councils and other funding bodies. The first National Centres – National ICT
Australia (NICTA) and the National Stem Cell Centre - were both funded by
direct grants and funding through ARC. NICTA involves collaboration
between the federal, NSW and ACT governments and two universities.
Significantly, the administration of the CRC Program remains separate from
the main research councils.
The research councils themselves to sponsor a range of collaborative
arrangements from grants and industry-linked scholarships and fellowships
through to large collaborative centres. Examples include the ARC’s ‘Linkage
Program’. Other government schemes, such as the R&D Start program and
the R&D Corporations also support cross-sector collaboration. Observers
have pointed to the range of cross-sector research, training and
commercialisation arrangements in Australia and stress the need for policy to
maintain and support this plurality and complexity (Garrett-Jones and
Turpin, 1997); (Howard Partners, 2001). Managing the growth of crosssector collaboration is a significant challenge for universities and research
institutions. As Tim Turpin has noted, ‘the CRCs have acted as powerful
vanguards in the transformation of the university research system’ (Turpin,
1997). This transformation carries notable risks to the university as an
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organisation and to academic research (Garrett-Jones et al., 2005) and it is
possible that the system’s ‘carrying capacity’ for this form of collaborative
centre has been reached.
Howard’s record on science and innovation
The federal government’s approach to science and innovation may be
characterised in several ways. First, they have seen science and innovation
policy as a ‘zero sum’ game. Despite well-publicised policy announcements
such as the two ‘Backing Australia’s Ability’ policy statements there has
been very little increase in spending in real terms and, as a proportion of
GDP, government outlays have fallen by almost one-fifth since they took
office. As a result policy changes have had to be effected through
reallocation of resources or thorough non-budget sources of funding. The
main ‘losers’ in this reallocation have been the business sector and to some
extent the government research agencies, while the ‘winners’ have been the
main research councils and the universities. This places huge pressure on the
universities which are being required to take on the tasks of collaborating
more closely with business and carrying out much of the industrially
oriented, regionally important and public good strategic research.
Second, policy initiatives have become surprisingly pragmatic and
interventionist in relation to industrial innovation, Business innovation policy
has become less neo-liberal in some aspects – reflecting a compromise
between political interests. But the government’s approach to the public
sector – where a strongly market-led philosophy has prevailed – has been far
more dogmatic. The imperative for commercial funding and commercial
returns has eroded the capability for public interest research and undermined
strategic industrial research in the government sector.
Third, not surprisingly in this policy environment, has been the emphasis
on leveraging the resources of all parts of the innovation system in order to
achieve efficiencies and synergies in research outcomes. However, again,
one can argue that these initiatives have emphasised near-term commercial
outcomes at the expense of longer term benefits to society as whole.
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CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT
Where does Australia’s national system of innovation stand in the first
decade of the 21st Century? By comparison with many of the case study
countries in this volume, Australia has enviably strong, robust and dynamic
capabilities in science and innovation. But, despite much rhetoric and reorganisation, in my view the system in general and federal policy in
particular has simply ‘marked time’ over the last decade.
With regard to funding, both the national expenditure on R&D and
business expenditure on R&D have barely increased as proportion of GDP
over the last 10 years. The low level of industrial R&D thus remains as much
of an obstacle to Australia’s progress as it did in 1996. The problems of
industry structure (particularly the lack of innovation in small firms) remain.
It has proven difficult to develop innovation-based enterprises even in areas
where Australia has a strong science base:
‘there is little evidence of significant, emerging areas of
technological specialisation’…’we are not generating ‘sustainable
new paths of technological accumulation’ (Scott-Kemmis, 2004a).
(Page no.)
Krishna has commented ‘the science policy discourse over the last decade led
to the emergence of a new system of innovation in Australia’ around
collaboration in research and commercialisation (Krishna, 2005). (page no.)
But this ‘collaborative research’ space has not only grown but has become
increasingly contested and even confused. As Krishna correctly observes, the
research roles of CSIRO and the universities are converging (Krishna, 2005).
Where one could formerly identify clearly distinct roles for the government
research agencies, universities and ad hoc mission-oriented research
programs, there is now a plurality of policy, funding and research performing
agencies competing variously for human resources (the scientists), for
partners (firms and research groups) and of course for funding. These
changes may well be beneficial but will have far reaching and as yet
unknown consequences for the future management of higher education,
research and research funding in Australia.
The government has compounded the weakness of the business sector by
pressure on the strong ‘science base’ – one of Australia’s acknowledged
strengths. Government outlays on science and innovation and on higher
education research have fallen as a proportion of GDP. Trying to ‘answer’
the challenges of Australia’s innovation system within a zero sum game is
unlikely to be successful while other countries are substantially increasing
their commitment to science, innovation and learning.
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The past federal Chief Scientist, Dr Robin Batterham, observed that science
and technology in Australia was not at the top of the Treasury’s priority list,
unlike in the United Kingdom (Anon., 2005). Despite some worthwhile
structural reforms, science and innovation policy in Australia does not
occupy centre stage: not in strategic planning, not in resource allocation and
not in the minds of business, public and politicians. As Tim Turpin has
acutely observed, this means we are stuck with an old paradigm, where
‘science as an institution, a career or a national objective is not deeply
embedded in Australian cultural values’. The challenge to Australia remains
to ‘bring science and technology in from the cold… integrated with and
embedded in the culture, ideas and markets that comprise our national
innovation system’ (Turpin, 2000). The invocation of former AVCC head
Ian Chubb is apt: ‘I suggest that we can’t afford to wait. Nobody else is
waiting for us’ (Wood and Meek, 2002: 23).
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